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Experience, Not Logic: Adapting Spoliation Doctrine to the
Brave New World of Digital Documents
Roni A. Elias*
1. INTRODUCTION
The adversarial system requires full discovery as an essential element of a
fair and accurate litigation process.' The parties to litigation must be able to
review the entire universe of relevant, and potentially relevant, evidence.2 Not
surprisingly, spoliation-the destruction of evidence with a culpable state of
mind-is an anathema to the most fundamental principles governing litigation
procedure and in turn may warrant harsh sanctions.
The doctrines governing how courts respond to spoliation are well
* I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the entire Florida A&M, College of Law faculty and
staff. To Dean Darryll K. Jones, Professor Jennifer Smith, Professor Patricia Broussard, Professor Omar
Saleem, Professor Alexis Leventhal, Professor Robert Minarcin, Professor Norman Hull, Professor Carlos
Woody, Professor Ka'Juel Washington, Professor Nicola Boothe-Perry, Professor Joseph Richard Hurt, special
thanks for their guidance, time, teachings, and for being remarkable people. To my heart, M.G.S, you are my
inspiration and my best friend. To Mr. John Morgan, Esquire, special thanks for all of your insight and
wisdom. I also would like to thank and appreciate Dr. Elmira Mangum, Distinguished Educator of the Year,
President, Florida A&M University, for her continuous support of the College of Law. Provost and Vice-
President for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Marcella David, I thank as her passion drives her to
perform at a higher level and to make a difference. To Dr.'s Aida & Adil Elias, my first great teachers in life, I
thank you and dedicate this paper to you. I am truly grateful to the best brother anyone could be blessed to
have: my brother, Pierre A. Elias.
1. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better The Economics of
Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DuKE L.J. 889, 892 (2009) (describing importance of
discovery in litigation).
2. See Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field,
54 RUTGERS L. REv. 595, 598 (2002) (observing aim of discovery to settle disputes based on facts revealed
instead of concealed facts).
3. See Lauren R. Nichols, Note, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Litigator? The Varying Degrees of Culpability
Required for an Adverse Inference Sanction Regarding Spoliation of Electronic Discovery, 99 KY. L.J. 881,
881 (2011) (outlining problematic nature of spoliation and potential for sanction).
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established.4  But these venerable rules were mostly devised for a discovery
process that involved the production of paper documents.5 Given these origins,
the rules defining when the destruction of documents reflected culpable
conduct were based on presumptions of how paper documents would be
preserved and produced when a litigation matter arose.
6
The information revolution that accompanied the dramatic expansion of
computers to produce and store every kind of document forever transformed
the discovery process.7 As computer use increased, the volume of information
produced, stored, and made readily available in discovery has improved
exponentially.8 Although advances in technology have made what used to be
unimaginable amounts of data relatively cheap and easy to compile today, these
same advances also have their drawbacks.9 Part of the information revolution
also included the development of systems for the routine destruction of stored
data. 10
As data destruction became a necessary part of managing any form of
digitized information, the rules governing spoliation had to change.1'
Specifically, the rules had to be adapted so courts could distinguish between the
innocent destruction of data as an ordinary incident of maintaining a computer
system and the culpable destruction of data to evade a discovery obligation in
litigation.12 In 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) were
amended to facilitate this distinction, but the effect of these amendments was
mixed.13 Ambiguities in the revised rules made it difficult for courts to reach
reasonable, uniform conclusions about what kind of conduct constituted the
culpable destruction of documents.14  Courts diverged on whether failing to
take the most effective measures to preserve documents reflected the same
culpability that had always been the object of the rules prohibiting spoliation
4. See id. at 881-82 (recognizing general agreement on spoliation definition and sanction range).
5. See id at 883-83 (observing rules of discovery conceptually apply to all forms of discoverable materials).
6. See Ben Farrell, Note, Spoliation in a Digital World: Proposing a New Standard of Culpability in
Massachusetts for an Adverse Inference Instruction, 14 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 110, 112 (2009)
(noting similarity of courts' treatment of electronic information and paper documents despite fundamental
differences).
7. See Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory, and Precedent: Finding the Right Pond, Lure,
and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REv. 25,25 (2011) (highlighting view of
electronic discovery as emerging field of practice following advent of computerized information).
8. See id. at 26 (discussing "staggering" statistics surrounding e-mail traffic and storage of other business
information).
9. See id at 26-27 (noting decreased information storage costs due to advances in technology).
10. See Farrell, supra note 6, at 112-13 (describing need for comprehensive retention and destruction policy
for vast quantities of information).
11. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 29 (noting several changes to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
accommodate electronic discovery).
12. See id. at 32 (discussing additional safe harbor for information lost through routine operation of
information system).
13. See Julia M. Ong, Another Step in the Evolution of E-Discovery: Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Yet Again?, 18 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 404,416-17 (2012) (observing mixed results of 2006
amendments).
14. See id at 417 (highlighting inconsistent application of amended Federal Rules).
[Vol. XLIX:203
EXPERIENCE, NOTLOGIC
and imposing sanctions for it.'
5
This Article examines the continuing effort by the drafters of the Federal
Rules and the courts to determine how to regulate document destruction in the
digital age. Part I of this Article reviews the basic problem of preserving
digitized information.16 Part II considers how the courts traditionally treated
breaches of the duty to preserve documents.'7 In Part III, this Article examines
how the Federal Rules were first amended to modify the method for imposing
sanctions regarding the spoliation of digitized information.'8 Part IV discusses
cases in which courts struggled to implement the 2006 amendments to the rules
against spoliation consistently.19 Finally, Part V reviews recently proposed
modifications to the 2006 amendments, anticipating some of the problems that
may arise with these proposed changes.20 This Article concludes that the
difficulty courts and drafters face in defining culpable destruction is an
inevitable consequence of the constantly shifting technological circumstances
surrounding the creation and storage of information. Although it may be
unsatisfying to live with significant uncertainty about the rules governing
spoliation, it may be a necessity, and developing a comprehensive, consistent
body of case law may be more a matter of measured evolution than that of
brilliant insight or invention.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRESERVING ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
(ESI)
The digital revolution has transformed how individuals and entities create,
collect, and store information. Computers make it possible to create and
retain numerous versions of any kind of document as well as virtually all
electronic communications, from e-mails to telephone calls.22 The digital age
has fundamentally changed the ability to share and store large amounts of
electronic information.23 For example, inter-office communications, uch as e-
mails, are available for access at any computer within a company's network
regardless of the physical location of the author or recipient.24 This electronic
storage allows information to be saved in multiple locations instead of filling
15. See id. at 417-18 (describing various reasons courts inconsistently apply amended Federal Rules).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS.
J. 206, 207 (2001) (noting fundamental difference between electronic and hard-copy discovery).
22. See Allman, supra note 21, at 206 (highlighting dramatic way electronic methods changed retrieval and
production of records); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561,
584-87 (2001) (delineating various retention and storage techniques for ESI).
23. Allman, supra note 21, at 206 (stressing increase in "sheer volume" of information digitally available).
24. See id. (observing increased number of locations where ESI maintained and stored).
2016]
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up filing cabinets in hardcopy form.25 Any event or transaction implicated in a
litigation matter can be associated with an enormous and often overwhelming
volume of this ESI.
26
The volume of ESI routinely created presents significant challenges in data
management.27  Although computerized storage is extensive, it does have its
limits. For companies that produce massive amounts of ESI, keeping all of
these documents can be burdensome on a system.29  As a result, most
organizations have processes for cleaning up these files periodically,
overwriting documents that are considered old, and making space for cases
needed in the immediate future.
30
The process of creating backup copies and deleting old or unwanted data is
often automated.31 These computer systems include a program or function that
destroys "old" data while creating new backup copies.32  The information
retained is often stored in an unorganized and unwieldy manner, sometimes
making retrieval difficult.33  In litigation, a significant risk is that of
unintentional errors that lead to the destruction of evidence or-perhaps more
accurately-failing to preserve evidence that could be relevant and
discoverable.
34
Under the standards developed for document retention in a pre digital world,
the automated destruction of ESI could lead to discovery sanctions.35  If
document retention standards are not adapted to the realities of the digital
world, a large company regularly threatened with litigation will be required to
"constantly review its backup tapes for documents that could, at some later
point in the litigation process, be deemed relevant; and if the enterprise
predicted incorrectly, it would risk imposition of severe sanctions.'36  The
expense of such a process could easily prove prohibitive because a careful
review of unorganized backup tapes would require that knowledgeable
individuals devote an enormous and unending number of hours to review
25. See id. (evaluating differences between electronic and hardcopy storage).
26. See Redish, supra note 22, at 589 (describing likelihood of ESI resulting in increased number of
documents produced during discovery).
27. See id. at 584-85 (explaining different levels of preservation and difficulty retrieving such data).
28. See id. at 585-86 (discussing problems of limited backup and processes for storing backup tapes).
29. Redish, supra note 22, at 585-86 (noting burdens placed on companies with large volume of ESI).
30. See id. (observing need for automated processes deleting and overwriting ESI).
31. See id. (comparing automated backup to backup through other means).
32. See id. at 586 (describing automated backup of data).
33. Redish, supra note 22, at 585 (evaluating shortcomings of backup tapes). The disorganized manner in
which information is stored on backup tapes makes retrieval of a singular document very difficult. Id.
Therefore, systems that rely on backup tapes are most often used only under emergency circumstances, with
intervention by computer experts. Id.
34. See Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of Applying
Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 4 (2006) (noting
concerns with regard to preservation of ESI).
35. See id. 4-5, 58 (demonstrating detrimental effect of automatic deletion).
36. Redish, supra note 22, at 623.
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processes.37  Additionally, total and indefinite retention of ESI would result in
significantly increased costs for the equipment necessary to store such
information and the physical space allocated to that equipment.
38
Because of the perils of applying outdated document retention rules, there
have been repeated efforts to amend the Federal Rules, particularly Rule 37, to
create a more flexible imperative that accounts for the difficulties of preserving
ESI.39  These efforts have attempted to identify what constitutes culpable
conduct in document retention policies and practices.40  But the identification
41of what is wrongful has not proven to be easy.
III. SPOLIATION SANCTIONS AND THE REGULATION OF DISCOVERY
Courts have broad authority to regulate how parties preserve and produce
evidence. 42 "A federal court has three sources for its power to sanction
breaches of the duty to preserve" documents for discovery: first, the specific
provisions of the Federal Rules, including Rules 26(g), 37(b)(2), and 37(c)(1);
second, 28 U.S.C. § 1927; and finally, the court's inherent power.43 Under
these provisions court sanctions include fines, attorney's fees and costs,
defaults, case dismissal, exclusion of witnesses, and fact establishment.44
"Spoliation" is the term describing the wrongful destruction of documents
that relate to a litigation matter. Through court rules and its own inherent
authority to assure fair litigation, a court may impose sanctions upon parties
responsible for spoliation.45 A court can impose sanctions when discoverable
material was destroyed and "the party or its counsel knew or should have
known [the material] was relevant to pending, imminent, or reasonably
foreseeable litigation. ' '46  Such sanctions may take several forms, from an
award of attorney's fees to a default judgment in favor of the innocent party.47
But the most commonly imposed spoliation sanction is the spoliation inference,
"'the oldest and most venerable remedy' for the spoliation of evidence."
48
37. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 34, 15 (observing excessive document preservation as
enormous and expensive burden).
38. Redish, supra note 22, at 623 (commenting on costs and burdens associated with physical equipment
required for total, indefinite retention).
39. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 34, 49-51 (discussing proposed changes to Rule 37).
40. See id. 61 (advocating rule change allowing safe harbor for routine computer operations).
41. See id. 49-51 (examining failure of proposed Rule 37 changes).
42. Greenwood v. Point Meadows Place Condo. Ass'n, No. 3:10-cv- 1183-J-34TEM, 2011 WL 5358682,
at * 1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011) (noting discretion of trial court to issue discovery orders).
43. See Clayton L. Barker & Philip W. Goodin, Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 64 J. Mo.
B. 12, 18 (2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (authorizing court sanctions for counsel "unreasonably and
vexatiously" extending proceedings); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g); FED. R. Clv. P. 37(b)(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
44. Barker & Goodin, supra note 43, at 18 (describing potential sanctions).
45. JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OFEVIDENCE § 3.1 (1989).
46. Id.
47. See Barker & Goodin, supra note 43, at 18 (describing various forms of sanctions).
48. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 34, 7 (quoting Jonathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering
2016]
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The spoliation inference allows an unfavorable inference of fact "against a
litigant who has destroyed documents relevant to a legal dispute.' 49 This rule
can be characterized either as a regulation of discovery practice or as a rule of
evidence. Regardless of how it is characterized, the spoliation inference is a
powerful instrument for assuring litigants' full and fair access to all relevant
evidence.
As a general rule, imposing the spoliation sanction requires finding the party
who destroyed the evidence possessed a culpable state of mind.51  In the
context of spoliation, culpable states of mind can range from negligence to
recklessness to intentional conduct; sometimes, courts hold a party strictly
liable for spoliation.2  Usually, however, spoliation sanctions require some
level of intentional conduct.53  Writing before the dawn of the digital age,
prominent commentators noted that most authorities required some level of
intentional destruction prior to issuing a spoliation inference.
5 4
Negligence is ordinarily the minimal level of culpability. When a party is
"subjectively unaware" that a relevant document will be routinely destroyed
according to a standard document retention policy, the destruction of the
document is often viewed as negligence in the spoliation context.55 This state
of mind describes a situation where the party tried to comply with an obligation
to preserve relevant evidence, but nevertheless failed to preserve documents
because of subjectively unintentional ignorance.
56
Sanctions for spoliation can be fatal to a party's case.5 7  In cases dealing
Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 441, 444 (2001)).
49. GORELICK ETAL.,supra note 45, § 2.1.
50. See id.
51. United Med. Supply Co., v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 266 (2007) (discussing state of mind
spectrum in spoliation context, including negligence). Some courts require a showing of bad faith before
applying sanctions, while others require proof of intentional conduct. Id. at 266. Representing the other side of
the spectrum, some courts merely require a showing of fault ranging from negligence to bad faith, with the
level of sanctions dependent on where they fall within that range. Id
52. Id. at 266-67.
53. See, e.g., Vick v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975); INA Aviation Corp. v.
United States, 468 F. Supp. 695, 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Universe Tankships,
Inc. v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 276, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 528 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1975); Dow Chem. Co.
(U.K.) v. S.S. Giovannella D'Amico, 297 F. Supp. 699, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
54. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, § 2.8 (observing nearly unanimous prerequisite of intent for
spoliation inference).
55. Rena Durrant, Note, Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery, VI1. Spoliation of Discoverable
Electronic Evidence, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1803, 1818 (2005) (outlining negligence standard in context of
spoliation).
56. See id (explaining lawsuits put party on notice). Because the party "was on notice that the evidence
was potentially relevant to the litigation," unsuccessful attempts to procure missing evidence did not eliminate
the party's negligence. Id.
57. T. Patrick Gumkowski, Comment, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Island Judicial System and
Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spoliation: Why an Independent Cause of Action for the
Spoliation of Evidence Is the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 795, 810 (2005) (discussing potential
severity of sanctions and effect on litigation). Courts are often hesitant to impose sanctions such as issue
[Vol. XLIX:203
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with the discovery of hard-copy documents, when courts have deemed a party
negligent regarding its discovery obligations, these courts have been willing to
instruct the jury to infer that unpreserved evidence would have reflected
negatively on the spoliating party; this instruction is known as the spoliation
inference.58 A showing of negligence has also supported imposition of more
traditional monetary sanctions or a heightened burden of proof.59
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING PRESERVATION OF
ESI
The rules for spoliation sanctions that applied to paper document discovery
could not be so easily adapted to the digitized world of ESI.6 ° It was difficult
to translate the principles determining culpability to a context in which
decisions about retaining documents were made in a very different fashion.
6 1
Thus, revision in the rules for spoliation sanctions was necessary to account for
the automation of much of the process of storing and preserving documents.
62
The regulation of discovery had to account for computerized systems for
managing documents.
63
Beginning in the early 2000s, after commentary and criticism from scholars,
jurists, and practicing attorneys, changes to the federal discovery rules were
proposed to address the unique problems ESI posed.64 In drafting the rule
amendments, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee (Committee)
recognized that electronic information systems routinely modify and delete
information as a necessary business function and that suspending these
necessary business functions can be prohibitively burdensome and expensive.
65
preclusion or dismissal with prejudice because a party with strong arguments on the merits of a case may not be
able to prove the prima facie elements. See id Many courts, therefore, will impose lesser sanctions when
possible. See id
58. See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding adverse
inference instruction for destruction or loss of evidence); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir.
1993) (pointing to court's "broad discretionary power to permit" adverse inference from spoliation of
evidence); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting forceful inference of negligence
may lead to directed verdict), overruled by Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009).
59. See, e.g., Langley ex rel. Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1997) (employing
heightened burden of proof in response or spoliation); SDI Operating P'ship v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652, 653-54
(8th Cir. 1992) (opting to strike expert witness list in response to unintentional destruction of evidence);
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (highlighting
unavailability of sanctions absent bad faith or willful conduct).
60. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 34, 53 (proposing mitigating risk of sanction for ordinary
document retention systems).
61. See id. 4 (noting "very nature of electronic data" compels routine deletion of it).
62. See id. (acknowledging routine, automated data deletion even when preserved on back-up tapes).
63. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 34, 48 (demonstrating challenge of fairly regulating ESI).
64. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, AGENDA E-18, 22 (Sept.
2005) (discussing review of proposed amendments to Federal Rules).
65. See id. at 33 (observing burden and expense of suspending routine storage and deletion of ESI). The
Committee explicitly recognized that "suspending or interrupting" automated features that overwrite older files
2016]
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW
The Committee acknowledged the destruction of ESI could not be treated
according to the same standards that had long governed the destruction of non-
digital documents.66  The Committee, therefore, attempted to reconcile the
inherent imbalance in treating spoliation of ESI in the same way as spoliation
of traditional evidence.
67
The first draft of these amendments shaped a negligence standard for
imposing spoliation sanctions, requiring a party to try to preserve ESI when it
knew or should have known the ESI might be discoverable evidence in a
dispute.68 The draft rule on ESI read:
Unless a party violated an order in the action requiring it to preserve
electronically stored information, a court may not impose sanctions under these
rules on the party for failing to provide such information if:
(1) the party took reasonable steps to preserve the information after it knew or
should have known the information was discoverable in the action; and
(2) the failure resulted from loss of the information because of the routine
operation of the party's electronic information system.
69
According to the original version of the rule, a party could only avoid
sanctions if it reasonably attempted to preserve existing information that could
be requested in discovery.70  The Committee noted this standard was
"essentially a negligence test."7 1
This version of the rule was not presented in isolation, however. A footnote
to the proposed rule provided an alternative version that established a different
level of culpability, one providing for sanctions only when the destruction of
"can be prohibitively expensive and burdensome... in ways that have no counterpart in managing hard-copy
information." Id. It further acknowledged that large organizations that do not recycle backup tapes, "even for
short periods" of time, would have to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to maintain the tapes and continue
routine operations. Id. In addition to prohibitive costs, the Committee noted that "the most robust electronic
information systems" are unable to retain such voluminous amounts of ESI without regularly purging some of
the stored information. Id.
66. See id at 34 (commenting on "troublesome area distinctive of electronic discovery").
67. Redish, supra note 22, at 620 (highlighting inherent differences between destruction of ESI and
traditional evidence, with exception of willful destruction).
68. See Brian C. Dalrymple & Daniel Harshman, Electronic Discovery: What You Need To Know and
What It May Cost If You Don 't, NIXON PEABODY LLP (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/A
LA 03182005.pdf [http:/ perma.cc/B8JV-WZ7C] (quoting Rule 37 at subparagraph (f)). After the 2007
revision to the Federal Rules, Rule 37(f) was denominated as Rule 37(e). Disability Rights Council v. Wash.
Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 n.7 (D.D.C. 2007) (explaining rule change to avoid confusion).
69. Dalrymple & Harshman, supra note 68, at 11 (emphasis added).
70. Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 82 (July 25,
2005) [hereinafter Advisory Comm. July 2005 Memorandum] (discussing proposed Federal Rules amendments




ESI was the product of intentional or reckless conduct:
A court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information deleted or lost as a result of the
routine operation of the party's electronic information system unless:
(1) the party intentionally or recklessly failed to preserve the information; or
(2) the party violated an order issued in the action requiring the preservation of
the information.
72
These two versions prompted extensive public comment.73  Those who
favored imposing sanctions only for intentional or reckless conduct argued that
including a standard based on negligent conduct was superfluous, and they
argued that a rule without protection for the negligent loss of information
would only prevent conduct hat would not be sanctioned prior to writing the
new rule.
74
There was also significant opposition to the version of the rule requiring a
higher level of culpability for spoliation sanctions.75  The primary argument
against such a standard focused on the difficulty of proving intentional or
reckless conduct by a litigant who allowed an automated information system to
continue purging information.7 6 They further argued that additional discovery
regarding the discovery process itself might be needed to prove such "difficult
subjective issues."77  Proponents of this argument were concerned that he
footnote version would allow culpable spoliation to go unsanctioned.78
After this commentary, the drafters proposed a final version that took an
intermediate position, adopting a standard for evaluating culpability that fell
between the two previous forms.79  That standard is the good-faith standard
present in the rule, which reads: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a court
may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith
72. Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 32-33 n.** (Aug.
3, 2004) (emphasis added) (setting out original proposed amendments, including Rule 37(e) before adoption of
"good faith" standard).
73. See Andrew Hebl, Spoliation of Electronically Stored Information, Good Faith, and Rule 37(e), 29 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 79, 93 (2008) (commenting on substantial public discussion leading up to rule adoption).
74. See Advisory Comm. July 2005 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 82 (contending new rule provided
little meaningful protection).
75. See id. (observing other commentators found proposed footnote too restrictive).
76. See id. (arguing intentional or reckless tandard too difficult to prove).
77. Id.
78. See Advisory Comm. July 2005 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 82 (predicting lack of sanctions for
culpable spoliation if negligence standard not included).
79. See id. at 82-83 (favoring intermediate standard).
20161
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operation of an electronic information system."80  Under this version of the
rule, spoliation sanctions are precluded if the spoliating party acted in good
faith and the information was lost as the result of the routine operation of a
storage system.
This formulation of the rule begs the question: What is good faith? This
question is difficult to answer based on the rule's language and the realities of
any computerized system that manages ESI. These difficulties are intensified
when the custodian of ESI is a large business enterprise routinely and regularly
involved in litigation.
The first aspect of this difficulty arises from the rule's language-and a
broader body of law governing discovery procedure-recognizing the existence
of a duty to preserve evidence for litigation before litigation formally begins.
Courts routinely acknowledge that the duty to preserve evidence arises when
litigation is "reasonably foreseeable."81  In addition, courts have held that the
duty of preservation may even arise prior to the filing of a suit if a party should
have known of the relevance of certain evidence to a potential lawsuit.82 This
duty not only applies to admissible evidence relevant to a particular dispute but
also to inadmissible evidence "reasonably calculated to lead" to admissible
evidence through additional discovery.
83
Given the language of the original version of Rule 37(e) and because a duty
to preserve evidence exists before any litigation formally commences, it is
necessary to preserve information for litigation whenever a person or business
enterprise contemplates using or creating any computerized system for
managing ESI.84  This computerized system must be adapted to preserve
80. Advisory Comm. July 2005 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 84 (emphasis added).
81. GoRELCK ET AL., supra note 45, § 2.9 (asserting negative, pretrial inference of spoliation suggests
litigant's duty to preserve reasonably foreseeable useful evidence). "The notion that spoliation before trial
gives rise to an adverse inference suggests the existence of a legal duty to preserve evidence. Some courts
express this idea by stating that litigants have an affirmative duty to preserve evidence that is reasonably
foreseeable to be used in a pending action." Id. (emphasis added).
82. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (stressing duty to preserve "evidence
relevant to future litigation"); MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (D.N.J.
2004) (acknowledging duty to preserve evidence likely "requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation");
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (observing duty to preserve attaches
when evidence possibly "relevant to future litigation"); Lamarca v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 110, 127
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (providing duty to preserve evidence "even in absence" of complaint if litigation likely to
commence); McGinnity v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 183 F.R.D. 58, 60 (D. Conn. 1998) (articulating duty to
preserve upon likelihood of litigation); Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (requiring
party with reasonable anticipation of litigation to preserve evidence); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142
F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (enunciating duty to preserve evidence likely requested in discovery).
83. Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also
Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (stressing need to preserve potentially relevant
documents); Arista Records, Inc. v. Sakfield Holding Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2004) (explaining
destruction of relevant evidence warrants inference of damaging material); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen,
179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998) (affirming need to preserve evidence for potential litigation), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000).
84. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (evaluating need to preserve any ESI likely to result in
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information for whenever it might be needed. This need must be balanced
alongside the fact that it is unreasonable and impossible for any person or entity
to preserve all ESI indefinitely.85 Accomplishing this balancing act is even
more difficult for those routinely involved in litigation.86 For such actors, the
design of any computer system must include a protocol or policy that will make
it possible to retain ESI that a duty to preserve evidence might cover.
A document retention policy that will facilitate the preservation of evidence
significantly connected to a potential legal dispute is a necessary component for
any system storing ESI.87 Under the language of Rule 37(e), this policy must
reflect a "good-faith" effort to comply with the duty to preserve evidence.
88
Determining when a document retention policy reflects good faith is difficult,
however, especially because such policies must be formulated in advance and
without respect to any dispute or potential litigation matter.89 This leaves open
questions as to whether a court could reasonably conclude that a document
retention policy to preserve ESI was not developed and implemented in good
faith if the policy did not adequately account for the possibility that a certain
category of documents might require preservation for a certain period. And
further, it remains unclear how a court would assess the adequacy of a
document retention policy's ability to anticipate future needs for document
preservation.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE ORIGINAL 37(E)
In application, the open ended or ambiguous provisions of the original
version of Rule 37(e) proved problematic for federal courts. These problems
can be organized into three distinct categories. First, it proved difficult for
courts to consistently and objectively define the nature of the conduct that
constituted "good faith." Second, there was significant uncertainty about when
a party's duty to preserve documents would arise.90 Third, courts did not
universally rely on Rule 37(e) as the sole source of authority for regulating
spoliation. Courts employed varying standards for determining when sanctions
were appropriate and for determining what kind of sanctions should be
imposed.
litigation).
85. See Redish, supra note 22, at 623 (emphasizing impracticality of indefinite document retention).
86. See id. (noting unique difficulties for commercial organizations regularly facing litigation).
87. See id. at 588 (observing essential role ESI plays in litigation).
88. Advisory Comm. July 2005 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 83 (proposing good-faith standard).
89. See id. (acknowledging good faith may require additional intervention aftler litigation has
commenced). The Committee acknowledged a "litigation hold" may be needed to suspend an information
system's routine destruction of ES. Id.
90. Courts agreed that the duty could arise before the formal initiation of litigation but did not agree about
what kinds of pre-filing events triggered that duty.
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A. Defining the Boundaries of Good Faith
Shortly after Rule 37(e) became effective, a District of Columbia district
court considered whether a document retention policy was implemented in
good faith.9 1 Although certain aspects of this ruling are straightforward and
implicate no novelties associated with the preservation of ESI, the court's
decision highlights problems that can arise in assessing the extent of good faith
behind document retention policies. It also raises questions about how to
determine what is included in a document retention policy.
In Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington Metro.
Transit Authority,93 an advocacy group brought a disability discrimination
claim against the Washington, D.C. Transit Authority (Authority), alleging the
Authority had failed to provide adequate facilities for disabled persons.94 The
parties submitted a variety of discovery motions that the court decided together,
including the Disability Rights Council's motion that implicated the
Authority's document retention policies.95 As part of its computer system, the
Authority used an email-management program that automatically deleted
emails after sixty days.96  After the litigation began, the Authority did not
disable this function or limit its effect.97 Aggravating matters, the Authority
admitted that, even after the litigation began, it knew about but did not use
software available for programming overrides to stop automatic disposal of
emails in accordance with a litigation hold.98 The Authority had backup tapes
that contained archived copies of the destroyed emails, and the Disability
Rights Council moved to compel the Authority to organize the data on those
backup tapes so the data could be searched by keyword for emails related to,
and discoverable in, the litigation.99 The Authority argued that restoring the
data from the backup tapes and conducting searches of the tapes imposed an
unreasonably expensive and burdensome obligation.'00 Although the Disability
Rights Council did not bring its motion on Rule 37(e) grounds, the district court
considered that rule and its attendant commentary in determining the
91. Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 (D.D.C. 2007)
(interpreting "new amendment o Rule 37").
92. See id. at 147 (discussing factors considered when ordering discovery from inaccessible sources).
93. 242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C. 2007).
94. See id. at 141 (discussing basis for discrimination claim).
95. See id. at 145.
96. See id. at 146.
97. Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting
plaintiff did not institute "litigation hold" after action commenced).
98. See id. at 146 n.8 (observing commercial availability of software to comply with obligation to
preserve emails).
99. See id at 147.
100. See id. The Authority further argued the backup tapes were neither "reasonably accessible" nor likely
to contain relevant information. See id.
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Authority's responsibilities in discovery.1
01
The district court began by recapitulating the Advisory Committee's
discussion of good faith in the development and application of a document
retention policy for Rule 37(e).102  Recognizing that Rule 37(e) applies
specifically to evidence lost in the "routine operation of an information
system," the court observed that the overarching duty to preserve might arise
from other sources of law as well.103 Rule 37(e), therefore, requires the good
faith intervention of parties to preserve relevant ESI that would otherwise be
purged by the automated functions of an information system when a litigation
hold is necessary.'04
Accepting this conception of good faith, the district court concluded that the
Authority should be compelled to organize and produce the data on the backup
tapes because the Authority failed to act in good faith with regard to preserving
emails.105  Although the district court did not directly invoke the authority
created by Rule 37(e) to impose sanctions, it clarified-in a vivid metaphor-
that the Authority's failure to adequately manage its document deletion
function was an instance of bad faith. 1
06
Other courts have followed the example of the Disability Rights Council
Court. In Peskoff v. Faber,107 the District of Columbia district court followed
Disability Rights Council, and held that once a preservation obligation arises,
"[t]he Advisory Committee comments to amended Rule 37[(e)] make it clear
that any automatic deletion feature should be turned off and a litigation hold
imposed."'1 8  The court further held that a failure to do so could support a
finding of sanctions per se.109 Consequently, failure to halt the automated
purging feature of an information system could rise to the level of bad faith
required to impose sanctions under the amended Rule 37(e).1 0
Another problem with applying the good-faith standard in the original
version of Rule 37(e) is that it is not clear what constitutes a document
101. See Disability Rights Council, 242 F.R.D. at 146-47 (applying Rule 37(e) and its commentary to case
at hand).
102. See id. at 146 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 37 advisory committee note to 2006 amendments).
103. See id. (acknowledging Rule 37(e) not sole authority bearing on duty to preserve). Common law
doctrines, statutory and regulatory language, and court orders specific to a particular case also govern the duty
to preserve. Id.
104. See id. (requiring party intervention to preserve relevant information potentially purged by standard
retention policy).
105. See Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 147 (D.D.C. 2007)
(eliminating undue cost and burden exception where party "failed to preserve accessible information").
106. See id. (explaining rationale for imposing sanctions). The court compared the Authority's actions to
"Leo Kosten's definition of chutzpah: '[T]hat quality enshrined in a man who, having killed his mother and
father, throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is an orphan."' Id.
107. 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007).
108. Id. at 60 (citing Disability Rights Council, 242 F.R.D. at 146).
109. See id. (observing likelihood of sanctions absent amended rule under circumstances).




retention policy. How comprehensive must a document retention policy be for
it to count as a part of the "routine operation" of a computer system? A
Connecticut district court considered this question in Doe v. Norwalk
Community College.'11
In Norwalk Community College, the plaintiff filed a complaint against a
community college arising from Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, with state law claims for negligent retention and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.12 In discovery, the plaintiff made a forensic examination
of the defendant's computer system to assess when and how it had destroyed
ESI and whether such destruction followed the defendant's document retention
policies.113 On the basis of that examination, the plaintiff moved for sanctions
under Rule 37(e), contending the defendant failed to adequately comply with its
duty to preserve ESI once it had notice of litigation.114  According to the
plaintiff, a state-government-imposed general policy that required the retention
of documents for two years governed the defendant, a public community
college." 5 Despite this policy, after the start of litigation, the hard drives of
computers used by some employees had been scrubbed of all data, including
significant data that was less than two years old. 16 The defendant opposed the
motion by contending that certain aspects of the statewide document retention
policy did not apply and that part of the data destruction had been the product
of hardware problems with particular devices.117 The defendant attempted to
defend its handling of data by characterizing several instances of data
destruction as isolated incidents, which the comprehensive two-year document
retention policy did not govern; to frustrate the plaintiffs discovery efforts, the
defendant also denied any deliberate attempts to destroy data.'18
The district court rejected the defendant's attempts to redeem its decisions
about document retention. 119  It concluded the absence of a comprehensive
litigation hold communicated to all appropriate employees was evidence of the
absence of good faith. 12  The court held that the good-faith standard required
the parties' affirmative action to identify and preserve relevant documents.
121
The assessment of what was and was not relevant could not be left up to
111. 248 F.R.D. 372 (D. Conn. 2007).
112. Id. at 374-75; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2012) (codifying ban on discrimination practices).
113. See Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. at 375 (describing computer system inspection).
114. See id. (seeking adverse inference against defendant for destroying ESI).
115. See id. at 376 (introducing retention policy).
116. See id. (observing policy not consistently followed).
117. See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 376 (D. Conn. 2007) (evaluating defendant's
justification for not preserving ESI).
118. See id. (proffering non-culpable reasons for ESI destruction).
119. See id. at 377 (finding defendant did not properly retain ESI in face of litigation).
120. See id. at 377-78 (stressing litigation hold importance).




individual employees; rather, central authority in the organization must drive
this determination.1
22
One problem with Norwalk Community College is that the good-faith
requirement seems to have been interpreted as making negligence a basis for
sanctions. In Norwalk Community College, it seemed as though the loss of ESI
was attributable to a failure to implement a policy. 123  A party's failure to
execute a policy is more attributable to negligence and less like the absence of
good faith.
124
The Norwalk Community College decision is not the only one in which a
court seems to import a negligence standard into the good-faith evaluation of
the original version of Rule 37(e). A Colorado district court reached a similar
conclusion about the necessity of having a comprehensive document retention
policy as a part of the "routine operation" of a system for managing ESI and
assuring that individual employees complied with that system.125 In Cache La
Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant infringed its trademark rights in the name "Profile" for animal
feed.126  During discovery, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not
preserved all discoverable ESI after its duty of preservation arose.127  The
defendant asserted it had informed employees of the pending litigation and of
the need to preserve documents related to the dispute, but it also acknowledged
its failure to give those employees instructions about how to identify
documents or about the specific steps necessary for preservation.' 28 The district
court held these efforts were not enough to comply with the requirement of
good faith. 129  In its view, the defendant's actions were not sufficiently
comprehensive and did not include adequate instructions to assure preservation
of discoverable ESI.13
0
122. See id. (admonishing defendant for lacking "one consistent, 'routine' system"). The dean testified
that the two-year retention policy was not followed in cases of computers belonging to teachers that had left the
college. Jd. The college registrar explained that she was not informed of the pending litigation until days
before her deposition and that she never conducted a records search. Id. Finally, the head of human resources
testified that she had never heard of a "litigation hold" and was never asked to implement one. Id.
123. See id. (condemning failure to adhere to policy).
124. See id.
125. See Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 629 (D. Colo. 2007)
(outlining party's obligations with regard to document retention).
126. See id at 616 (describing nature of complaint).
127. See id. at 624 (discussing timing and scope of litigation hold). In this case, the parties also disputed
when the obligation to preserve evidence arose. Id.
128. See Cache La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 624-25 (explaining defendant instituted litigation hold, but
simply accepted whatever materials employees provided). Employees were asked to search all materials
relevant to the PROFILE brand. Id. Land O'Lakes' general counsel explained that the company simply trusted
the employees' judgement regarding what should be turned over, and relied upon that judgment in concluding
that it provided all relevant information to the opposing party. id.
129. See id. at 629 (reiterating need to retain information on "continuing basis" and faulting "less than
thorough" preservation).
130. See id. at 629-30 (explaining defendant's shortcomings in ESI preservation).
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Courts in the Second Circuit have held that negligence in document retention
can be sanctioned.131  These courts have relied on authority predating the
original version of Rule 37(e) in holding that negligence can be a basis for
spoliation sanctions. In Sekisui American Corp. v. Hart, a New York district
court held that in implementing spoliation sanctions, negligence would be a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. 132
The district court explained that the culpability factor merely requires that a
party knowingly allowed the destruction of evidence, even if it was destroyed
through the lowest standard of negligence.133 Viewing an adverse inference
instruction as "the necessary mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance,"
the court held that the instruction was needed primarily because the evidence
was destroyed, rather than "any finding of moral culpability" by the destroying
party.134  The court, therefore, held that the adverse inference instruction
needed to be examined on a case-by-case basis because the culpable destruction
of evidence could land at various points along the "continuum of fault,"
including negligence.135
Given all of this, it seems as though the good-faith standard of the original
version of Rule 37(e) found little consistent interpretation about what
constitutes good faith. To put it another way, courts could not agree on
whether good faith is the absence of bad faith or if it involved the highest
standard of conduct: the absence of both bad faith and any negligence. The
flexibility of this reading of the rule made it difficult for parties to predict how
to fulfill their obligations to preserve evidence.
B. Determining When the Preservation Obligation Arises
Just as it was difficult for courts to agree about what the duty of preservation
should entail, it has also been difficult for courts to agree on when that duty
arises. The district court for the District of Columbia in Peskoff considered the
parties' obligations to preserve evidence before the actual commencement of
litigation.' 36  The court held that the defendant's failure to turn off the
automatic deletion feature before notice of litigation could not be sanctioned
even as the parties' relationship began to deteriorate.
137
But Peskoff leaves the answers to some questions unclear. If the duty to
131. See Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart, 945 F. Supp. 2d 494, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (permitting case-by-case
inquiry including varying degrees of negligence).
132. See id. at 503 (suggesting adverse inference potentially appropriate due to negligent destruction).
133. See id. at 503-04 (accepting destruction by negligence as reason for sanctions).
134. See id. (rejecting need for intentionality to impose adverse inference instruction).
135. See Sekisui Am. Corp., 945 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (retaining ability to impose sanctions for negligent
destruction on case-by-case basis).
136. See Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 61 (D.D.C. 2007) (examining duty to stop automatic deletion
before litigation notice).




preserve documents does not arise when the parties' relationship was
deteriorating, and if that duty exists when the litigation formally begins, courts
and litigants will still be called upon to precisely determine when the duty
arises prior to litigation. This issue was brought to bear in Oxford House, Inc.
v. City of Topeka.'38
In Oxford House, a Kansas district court held that the preservation duty
arises when a party receives an explicit threat of litigation.139 The court began
its analysis noting that spoliation is at issue only when a party fails to preserve
evidence when the threat of litigation is looking at the party "in the face.140 It
then concluded the obligation to preserve documents arose when the defendant
received a demand letter from the plaintiff.
14'
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear how specific a demand letter must be in
threatening litigation in order for it to give rise to a duty to preserve ESI. In
Cache LaPoudre Feeds, the parties disputed when the defendant had been
sufficiently placed on notice of the reasonable possibility of litigation. 142 The
plaintiffs outside counsel had written a letter to the defendant in June 2002,
asserting that the defendant was violating the plaintiffs trademark rights and
expressing hope for a negotiated settlement.43  A year later, the plaintiffs
outside counsel again wrote to the defendant, expressing hope for some
negotiated resolution to the trademark rights dispute.144 Despite these letters,
the district court concluded that the defendant's obligation to preserve
documents did not arise until February 2004, when the plaintiff filed its
complaint. 145
C. Relying on Inherent Powers Instead of the Rule
Another area in which courts diverge on the question of how to sanction the
failure to preserve documents is the source of the authority for imposing such
sanctions. In Nucor Corp. v. Bell,146 the plaintiff alleged that its former
138. No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at *I (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007).
139. See id. at *3 (observing notice to preserve commonly arises at first discovery request or filing of
complaint).
140. See id. (reconciling need to preserve and knowledge of pending litigation).
141. See id. (stressing importance of demand letter to place party on notice of pending litigation). In the
case at hand, the preserving party was unaware of pending litigation prior to receipt of a demand letter. Id.
The court, therefore, was willing to take into account that relevant information may have been deleted "before
the duty to preserve arose." Id.
142. See Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC, v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 622 (D. Colo. 2007)
(describing non-litigious negotiations between parties).
143. See id (noting letter from plaintiff to defendant attempting to resolve trademark dispute).
144. See id.
145. See id. (concluding defendant "clearly" obligated to preserve evidence upon filing initial complaint).
The court determined a request to preserve or "preservation letter" from the opposing party does not trigger the
common law duty to preserve. Id. The court explained if such were the case, organizations would have to
retain inexplicable amounts of records and information at any slight mention of "discontent." Id.
146. 251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008).
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employee had stolen trade secrets, and in discovery, it also alleged that he
defendant had spoliated evidence stored on a thumb-drive and laptop computer,
which the defendant used during his employment.147 Regarding the laptop, the
defendant contended the good-faith provision of Rule 37(e) protected him
because any loss of ESI on the laptop resulted from his continued use of the
computer in an ordinary way until the litigation had formally begun and that
any data loss resulted from overwriting that was a part of such ordinary use.148
In rejecting this argument, the South Carolina district court concluded that the
good-faith rule was beside the point when the court imposed sanctions under its
inherent powers. 149
At least one other district court has agreed that its own inherent powers can
supplement the Federal Rules to sanction spoliation when the text of the rules
does not seem to directly apply.150 These holdings also contribute to the
potential for inconsistency in applying spoliation standards for the destruction
of ESI. If this principle were followed widely, a court could choose to opt out
of the regulatory regime imposed by the Federal Rules and sanction spoliation
according to its own standards whenever it concluded that the rules were
inadequate.
VI. THE PROPOSED 2014 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 37(E)
A. Nature of and Reasons for the Proposed Amendments
The uncertainties arising from the original formulation of Rule 37(e) have
prompted calls for reform.151 This agitation for changing the rule led to the
Committee's suggested amendments in 2014.152 These amendments seek to
create a uniform standard for federal courts in determining what kind of
culpability is required for spoliation sanctions and encourage courts to draw on
a wide range of factors to fashion sanction awards that cure prejudice caused by
147. See id. at 193-94 (outlining plaintiff's complaint).
148. See id at 196 n.3 (acknowledging defendant's safe-harbor argument u der Rule 37(e)).
149. See id. (asserting court's inherent powers to impose sanctions). The court further commented that the
safe-harbor provisions stated in the plain language of Rule 37(e) do not abrogate the court's inherent ability to
impose sanctions on a particular party to a case. Id.
150. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611-12 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(discussing and applying court's inherent authority to issue spoliation sanctions).
151. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation of ES1 After the 2006 Amendments: The Impact
of Rule 37(e), 3 FED. CTS. L. REv. 25, 26 (2009) (pointing to "intellectual disdain" for previous amendments to
Rule 37(e)); Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has the 37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices
for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.L. Sa. & TECH. 317, 319 (2010) (noting prior amendments to Rule
37(e) resulted in discovery dispute increases); Alexander Nourse Gross, Note, A Safe Harbor from Spoliation
Sanctions: Can an Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) Protect Producing Parties?, 2015 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 705, 717 (2015) (describing stakeholder concern over previous amendments to Rule 37(e)).
152. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, AGENDA E-19, app. at
B-i to B-2 (Sept. 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S4Y H-RF9T] [hereinafter SEPT. 2014 REPORT] (summarizing amendments to Federal Rules).
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less harmful forms of ESI spoliation.
153
The first significant proposed change to the language of Rule 37(e) is that it
establishes specific factual prerequisites that must be established before a court
can impose spoliation sanctions.154 To impose sanctions, a party must show:
ESI "should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation";
the relevant ESI was lost; the party charged with safeguarding the lost ESI
"failed to take reasonable steps to preserve" the information; and the lost ESI
"cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.' ' 55 The purpose
behind establishing these prerequisites is to assure that sanctions for any failure
to preserve ESI are based on the designated criteria and not the more open-
ended and potentially arbitrary use of a court's inherent powers.'56
The third and fourth prerequisites place an emphasis on assessing
preservation efforts in terms of reasonableness.157  This modification in the
approach for imposing sanctions means courts will no longer focus on whether
a party conformed to some abstract standard in developing a document
retention policy or in imposing a litigation hold. Rather, it now requires an
assessment of conduct in light of the particular context and the needs and
expectations of the parties regarding evidence. 
158
In addition to these four prerequisites, a party that seeks the most severe
sanctions available under Rule 37(e) must also demonstrate the alleged
spoliator "acted with the intent" to keep relevant information from the
receiving party "to deprive" the receiving party of useful information. 159 This
requirement creates a standard of specific, bad-faith intent to ensure the most
severe sanctions will be imposed only for the most flagrant violations of ESI
preservation duties.160  Given the language of the rule, the most severe
sanctions would not be appropriate for negligent or even grossly negligent
conduct.t 61 In a case like Norwalk Community College or Cache La Poudre
Feeds, where a party was sloppy or careless in its preservation efforts, an
adverse inference instruction should not be imposed under the proposed rule.
153. See id at B-14 (lamenting circuit split with regard to imposing spoliation sanctions).
154. See id. at B-58 (enunciating need for specific measures court may employ).
155. Id. at B-56.
156. SEPT. 2014 REPORT, supra note 152, at B-58 (foreclosing "reliance on inherent authority" to
determine sanctions).
157. See id. at B-61 to B-62 (emphasizing "reasonable steps" to preserve ESI sufficient to avoid most
serious sanctions). The Advisory Committee placed particular emphasis on the cost to preserve evidence and
on the party's "sophistication with regard to litigation" when assessing the reasonableness of a party's
preservation efforts. Id.
158. See id. at B-61 (evaluating various factors to determine reasonableness). "This rule recognizes that
'reasonable steps' to preserve suffice; it does not call for perfection." Id.
159. See id. at B-57 (requiring active intent for imposition of severe sanctions).
160. SEPT. 2014 REPORT, supra note 152, at B-64 to B-65 (stressing most severe sanctions appropriate only
upon showing "intent to deprive another party" of information).
161. See id. at B-65 (explaining adverse-inference instruction inappropriate for negligent or grossly
negligent conduct).
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The proposed amendments to Rule 37(e) also specifically identify the severe
sanctions that can be imposed. These measures are limited to: the dismissal of
the case; entering default judgment; or an adverse inference instruction to the
jury. 162 A court could also presume that the lost ESI was unfavorable to the
alleged spoliator. 16  But these sanctions are discretionary-not mandatory-
even when a court finds loss of ESI is attributable to bad faith. 16' As the
Committee cautions in the draft note, the sanction should be balanced against
the injury, and the destruction of unimportant information should result in a
lesser sanction as compared to significantly relevant evidence.
165
When the party seeking sanctions cannot establish that ESI was lost because
of a specific "intent to deprive," the court could then resort to curative
measures under Rule 37(e)(1) to address prejudice resulting from losing the
ESI. 166 The sanctions imposed in these circumstances must be proportional:
"no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice" to the aggrieved party.1 67
Although the text of the rule does not set forth the precise nature of such
proportionate remedies, a Committee report and the draft Committee note
suggest the remedies could include: precluding a party from presenting
evidence; allowing the parties to discuss the destruction of evidence before the
jury; a court instruction as to how to interpret the evidence; or excluding
admissible evidence in order to "offset" the prejudicial effect of not presenting
evidence that was destroyed.168  Given this wide range of discretionary
sanctions, a party could still obtain substantial relief for an opponent's
improper loss of ESI, even absent any finding that such loss was traceable to
bad faith.
B. Prospective Effect of the Proposed Amendments
If one reviews the proposed text of the amendments and the attendant
commentary in light of the case law applying the prior version of Rule 37(e), it
is easy to anticipate problems that may emerge in applying these amendments.
Although the proposed amendments solve many of the problems associated
with identifying the necessary level of culpability for imposing sanctions, there
are still significant ambiguities about the conduct that can trigger sanctions.
The principle change in the language governing the standard of conduct is
the reference to "reasonable steps to preserve" ESI in place of the concept of
162. See id. at B-57 (setting forth available sanctions).
163. See id.
164. See SEPT. 2014 REPORT, supra note 152, at B-67 (cautioning sanction use even upon finding intent to
deprive information to other party).
165. See id. (indicating sanction for spoliation of evidence "should fit the wrong").
166. See id. at B-57 (authorizing limited sanction use to cure prejudice of lost information).
167. Id.




"good faith."'169 A party who takes "reasonable steps to preserve" ESI cannot
be sanctioned.170  But the Committee provides little guidance on what
constitutes "reasonable steps." The draft note suggests sanctions may not be
appropriate if ESI is destroyed because of forces outside of a preserving party's
control such as flood, fire, hackers, or viruses.1 71 But this is only a suggestion.
The Committee note does not state equivocally that some force majeure
defense would be absolute. It advises that courts should consider what kind of
steps the party could have taken to prevent being subjected to such a
circumstance.172 In a real sense, this invites the same retrospective inquiry that
proved problematic in the "good faith" requirement: Courts will be in a
position to second-guess a party's efforts to anticipate problems and take
prophylactic steps against them. In this respect, shifting the initial inquiry from
"good faith" to "reasonableness" only changes the framework for the problem.
The force majeure problem could become especially difficult as more
individuals and enterprises store their data in the "cloud.'' 173  When a party
outsources its data storage to another entity, it loses control. Even if it has a
carefully drafted document retention policy that the cloud storage entity agrees
to observe, there is no guarantee the policy will be followed. 74 If the entity
with direct control over data storage fails in its obligations and destroys the
party's data, would that qualify as a force majeure? And if it did, what would
constitute adequate preparations by the party to anticipate the data storage
provider's failures?
There is similar ambiguity in the note's suggestion that proportionality
standards should temper the range of "reasonable" preservation efforts.'75 On a
purely theoretical level, it makes sense to claim that a court should not sanction
losing a small amount of ESI or losing ESI conceming a minor issue in a case
in the same way that it sanctions losing a large volume of data or losing data
absolutely crucial to resolving the dispute.'76  But the concept of
proportionality is amorphous and lends itself to highly subjective
interpretation.177 If the proposed amendments are proffered to impose more
limits on a court's discretion in determining when the loss of evidence warrants
severe sanctions, the proportionality component contributes little to solving the
169. See id. at B-61 (adopting reasonable-steps standard when evaluating ESI loss).
170. See id. (articulating reasonable steps, not perfection, sufficient to avoid sanctions).
171. See id. (considering potential for destruction outside party's control).
172. SEPT. 2014 REPORT, supra note 152, at B-61 (contending courts may consider party's knowledge and
ability to protect against force majeure risks).
173. See id (highlighting party's lack of control over cloud data storage).
174. See id. (observing potential third-party cloud storage system failure).
175. See id. at B-61 to B-62 (enunciating proportionality as "factor in evaluating" reasonableness of
preservation efforts).
176. See SEPT. 2014 REPORT, supra note 152, at B-67 (suggesting proportional sanction depending on
importance and amount of material destroyed).
177. See Farrell, supra note 6, at 117 (noting various jurisdictional views of determining correct remedy in
response to spoliation).
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problems arising from the original version of the rule.'
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Another concept in the proposed amendments may also evade firm
definition: "intent to deprive."'179 The draft Advisory Committee note provides
some clarity by pointing out that "intent to deprive" does not apply to negligent
or even grossly negligent conduct; there is still, however, plenty of room for
interpretation. The Committee report issued with the Rule 37(e) proposed
amendments explains that the "intent requirement is akin to bad faith."'' But
the draft Advisory Committee note is not this specific. It indicates that the
most serious sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) are limited "to instances of
intentional loss or destruction."'182 A party might well intentionally destroy
data, without, however, intending to obstruct discovery in a pending or
anticipated litigation matter. In this respect, "intentional" conduct could be less
culpable than "bad faith" conduct. The invocation of the concept of "bad faith"
merely seems like an inversion of the problem the concept of "good faith"
posed in the original version of the rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of controlling spoliation in the digital world is a difficult one to
manage. After considering how courts struggled to consistently apply the 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules and after projecting how courts may struggle
to interpret the proposed 2014 amendments, it seems that there is no easy way
to distinguish between the culpable destruction of ESI and destruction that is-
if not innocent-not deserving of sanctions. This is because evaluating the
culpability of any decision to destroy documents is highly contextual. Whether
a particular course of conduct reflects an effort to undermine the litigation
process or an effort to maintain efficiency in a computerized document storage
system depends upon a variety of factors that will never be the same in any two
cases. It is impossible to fashion a bright-line rule that will apply uniformly in
every case.
Drafting any rule about spoliation means establishing a somewhat relativistic
standard of conduct. In the first version of the spoliation rules for ESI, the
standard of conduct turned on the concept of "good faith." In the proposed
2014 amendments, the standard of conduct turns on the concept of
"reasonableness." Both are necessarily open-ended; their meanings will
depend upon the totality of the facts and circumstances. This conceptualism
means that courts will continue to reach varying conclusions about spoliation
178. See Philip J. Favro, The New ESI Sanctions Framework Under the Proposed Rule 37(e) Amendments,
21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8,19 (2015) (observing questions proposed 2014 amendments leave unanswered).
179. SEPT. 2014 REPORT, supra note 152, at B-64 to B-65 (forbidding severe sanctions absent intent to
deprive information to opposing party).
180. See id. (attempting to clarify rule based on intentional loss or destruction instead of negligence).
181. IdatB-17.
182. Id. at B-65.
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and the sanctions that should follow it. Uncertainty in this area of the law will
continue to ferment.
Unfortunately, it seems as though this period of uncertainty is inevitable.
There is no quick and easy way to conclusively define culpable document
destruction in a world where technology for managing documents is constantly
changing. Any rules or dispositive concepts that made sense in one context or
at one time may be inapplicable in a new situation or after a new stage in the
ongoing technological revolution. The problem of sanctioning spoliation may
be one that can be solved only by the gradual evolution of the law and the
accretion of a body of cases, not by a single brilliant insight. Once again,
Justice Holmes was correct when he wrote, "[t]he life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience.'
' 83
183. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Am. Bar Ass'n ed., 2009) (188 1).
2016]
- A
A,
--- A
